Sato-Crutchfield formulation for some Evolutionary Games by Ahmed, E. et al.
ar
X
iv
:n
lin
/0
30
40
10
v1
  [
nli
n.C
G]
  9
 A
pr
 20
03
Sato-Crutchfield formulation for some
Evolutionary Games
E. Ahmed1,2, A. S. Hegazi1 and A. S. Elgazzar3
1.Mathematics Department, Faculty of Science
35516 Mansoura, Egypt.
E-mail: hegazi@mans.edu.eg
2.Mathematics Department, Faculty of Science
Al-Ain, P. O. Box 17551, UAE.
3.Mathematics Department, Faculty of Education
45111 El-Arish, Egypt.
E-mail: elgazzar@mans.edu.eg
Abstract
The Sato-Crutchfield equations are studied analytically and nu-
merically. The Sato-Crutchfield formulation is corresponding to los-
ing memory. Then Sato-Crutchfield formulation is applied for some
different types of games including hawk-dove, prisoner’s dilemma and
the battle of the sexes games. The Sato-Crutchfield formulation is
found not to affect the evolutionarily stable strategy of the ordinary
games. But choosing a strategy becomes purely random independent
on the previous experiences, initial conditions, and the rules of the
game itself. Sato-Crutchfield formulation for the prisoner’s dilemma
game can be considered as a theoretical explanation for the existence
of cooperation in a population of defectors.
Keywords: Sato-Crutchfield formulation; evolutionarily stable strat-
egy; Evolutionary games; Persistence.
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1 Introduction
Evolutionary game theory [1] is one of the important topics in Mathematics.
Also it has many applications in Biology, Sociology and Economics. Gener-
ally a game consists of a group of players (of which two players at each game)
are interacting with each other obtaining payoffs. Every player is allowed to
choose some strategies, according to some rules. There are many different
types of games. Each of them has its own rules, strategies, properties and
applications.
Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) [1] is an important concept in popu-
lation dynamics. Consider a population in which each individual adopts one
of k possible strategies (Ij , j = 1, 2, ..., k). A strategy I∗ is ESS if for all
Ij 6= I∗ (yet close to it), then
(i) A(I∗, I∗) > A(Ij , I∗); or
(ii) If A(I∗, I∗) = A(Ij, I∗), then A(I∗, Ij) > A(Ij , Ij),
where A is the k × k payoff matrix.
Recently, Sato and Crutchfield [2] have introduced a new formulation that
is corresponding to mistakes or losing memory.
Our aim is to study Sato-Crutchfield formulation both analytically and
numerically. Stability and persistence of the solutions are studied. The per-
sistence of a dynamical system [3] is defined as follows:
Definition 1: A dynamical system is persistent if all cases where all ui(0) >
0 lead to
lim
t→∞
inf ui(t) > 0 ∀i = 1, 2, ..., n. (1)
Also, we study the Sato-Crutchfield formulation for some different types
of two-player games including hawk-dove (HD), prisoner’s dilemma (PD) and
the battle of the sexes games [1]. The Sato-Crutchfield formulation is shown
not to affect the ESS of the ordinary games. But in some limit, choosing
a strategy becomes random independent of the rules of the game and the
initial conditions.
The paper is organized as follow: In section 2, the Sato-Crutchfield for-
mulation is explained. Both analytical and numerical results are added. The
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Sato-Crutchfield equations is applied to HD game in section 3. Also the effect
on ESS is studied. Section 4 is devoted for studying the Sato-Crutchfield for
PD game and some of its modifications. In section 5, the Sato-Crutchfield
equations are introduced to the battle of the sexes. Some conclusions are
summarized in section 6.
2 Sato-Crutchfield formulation
Recently Sato and Crutchfield [2] have studied the dynamics of learning
in multiagent systems, where the agents use reinforcement learning. They
showed that, although the agents are not directly interacting with each other,
a collective game arises between them through their interaction with envi-
ronment. Such interactions can be modelled via replicator type equations.
Consider two agents u and v with n possible actions, let uj(t) (vj(t)) be
a measure of the probability that the agent u(v) will take action j at time
t. Sato and Crutchfield have shown that uj(t), vj(t) satisfy the following
equations
dui
dt
= uiβ1 [(Av)i − uAv] + α1ui
∑
j uj ln
(
uj
ui
)
,
dvi
dt
= viβ2 [(Bu)i − vBu] + α2vi
∑
j vj ln
(
vj
vi
)
,
(2)
where A and B are payoff (reward) matrices for u and v, respectively, and
α1, α2, β1, β2 are nonnegative constants. If α1 = α2 = 0, then one regains the
standard asymmetric replicator equations [1,4].
We will comment on the case α1 = α2 = α > 0. For simplicity only the
symmetric case will be considered (A = B = diag (a1, a2), u1 = v1, u2 = v2).
Rescaling time to set β1 = 1, the system becomes
du1
dt
= u1 (a1u1 − a1u
2
1
− a2u
2
2
) + αu1u2 ln
(
u2
u1
)
,
du2
dt
= u2 (a2u2 − a1u
2
1
− a2u
2
2
) + αu2u1 ln
(
u1
u2
)
.
(3)
Restricting to the region ui ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, then
Corollary 1: Bounded solutions of the system (3) are persistent.
This means that even bad strategies will be adopted by some agents. To
study this analytically assume a2 > a1 > 0. In the case that α = 0, it is
known that the best strategy is u2 = 1, u1 = 0 so for small α, we find
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u1 = exp
(
−
a2
α
)
, u2 = 1− u1. (4)
The solution (4) is asymptotically stable if
α > exp
(
−
a2
α
)
(2a1 + 4a2) . (5)
The persistence of all strategies can be understood intuitively by realizing
that α > 0 means memory decay [2]. This implies that some individuals
may not know which is the best strategy hence they choose the bad strategy.
Furthermore as α increases, u1, u2 become close to each other, since more
agents lose their memory. This agrees with the numerical simulations shown
in Fig. (1). Both u1 and u2 go to 0.5 for large α. At this point agents chose
their strategies randomly without any regard to previous experiences.
3 Sato-Crutchfield formulation for hawk-dove
game
The hawk-dove game [1] is a two-player game, where each player is allowed
to use the hawk strategy (H) or the dove strategy (D). It has many biological
and economic applications. The payoff matrix is given as follows
A =
[
1
2
(g − c) g
0 g
2
]
, (6)
where g is the value of gain and c is the cost of fight. The max-min solution of
von Neumann et al. [5] is to follow the D strategy for 0 < g < c. If 0 < c ≤ g,
then the max-min solution is to follow the H policy. But this solution is not
evolutionary stable, since a mutant adopting H strategy will gain much, this
will encourage others to adopt the H policy. This will continue till the fraction
of adopting the H policy (u1) becomes large enough to make the payoffs of
both strategies equal, thus
u1 =
g
c
. (7)
Applying the Sato-Crutchfield equations to HD game, the replicator equa-
tion becomes
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du1
dt
=
u1
2
[
(g − c)u1u2 + gu
2
2
]
+ αu1u2 ln
(
u2
u1
)
, (8)
where u2 = 1− u1 is the D density. This case is numerically investigated for
various values for g and c, see Fig. (2) for g = 1 and c = 4. The system is
updated for 105 time steps. The behavior of u1 is studied versus α. As shown
in Fig. (2), at α = 0, u1 = 1/4 in agreement with its ordinary value Eq. (7).
As α increases, u1 increases rapidly and becomes close to 0.5. Therefore,
for large α, agents choose their strategies (H or D) randomly with equal
probabilities. This behavior is independent on the initial conditions.
Sato-Crutchfield formulation does not affect the ESS. For example, con-
sider the hawk(H)-dove(D)-retaliate(R) game, where the payoff matrix is
given by
A =


1
2
(g − c) g 1
2
(g − c)
0 g
2
g
2
1
2
(g − c) g
2
g
2

 , c > v > 0. (9)
Let u1(u2) be the fraction of population adopting H (D) strategy, and u3 =
1 − u1 − u2 is the R-density. Then Sato-Crutchfield equations for the HDR
game become
du1
dt
= u1

− c
2
+
u1
2
(
c− g
2
) + u2(g + c)
2
−
u2
1
c
2
− cu1u2


+αu1
[
u2 ln(
u2
u1
) + u3 ln(
u3
u1
)
]
, (10)
du2
dt
= u2
[
u1
(
c−
g
2
)
−
u2
1
c
2
− cu1u2 + α
[
u1 ln(
u1
u2
) + u3 ln(
u3
u2
)
]]
.
It is known that for α = 0, the ESS is R. This means the solution u1 = u2 = 0
is asymptotically stable. Also, for α > 0, the ESS is R, and the solution
(u1 = u2 = 0, u3 = 1) is asymptotically stable. Beginning from nonzero
values for u1, u2 and u3, and for α > 0, the system always evolves to a state
at which u1 = u2 = u3 = 1/3. At this point, selecting a strategy becomes
random with equal probabilities. But beginning from a zero value for the
density of a strategy, it will not grow through the population.
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4 Losing memory and the prisoner’s dilemma
game
The existence of cooperation in a group of selfish individuals is an interest-
ing problem in mathematics and social sciences. One of the models of this
phenomenon is the Prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game [1]. In this case the avail-
able strategies are to cooperate (C) or to defect (D). The payoff matrix A is
[(R, S), (T, P )], where T > R > P > S and 2R > T + S. For simplicity we
take A = [(2, 0), (3, 1)].
The standard solution gives the unrealistic conclusion that players should
not cooperate. However cooperation has been shown to be a solution if the
game is modified into iterated PD, or PD on the lattice, or memory PD
[6,7]. Recently another modification is given [8], where a third strategy is
introduced so the allowed strategies are C, D and loner (L). In this case, the
payoff matrix is given as
A =

 0 b σ0 1 σ
σ σ σ

 (11)
where 2 > b > 1 and 1 > σ > 0. We call this game PDL game.
The Sato-Crutchfield equations for the PD game are
du1
dt
= u1
(
2u1 − 2u
2
1
− u2
2
− 3u1u2
)
+ αu1u2 ln
(
u2
u1
)
, (12)
where u1 is the defectors density and u2 = 1− u1 is the cooperators density.
It is known that for α = 0, the asymptotically stable strategy is (D) i.e.
u1 = 0, u2 = 1. This has caused the following question to arise: How can
cooperation exist in a population of defectors (selfish population)? Sato-
Crutchfield equations propose a new answer. Cooperation may arise due
to memory loss which is equivalent to mistakes. But starting from a small
number of cooperators in a defectors population what is the asymptotic ratio
of cooperators? For very small positive α e.g. O(0.01) it is straightforward
to see that the equilibrium solution is u1 = exp(−1/α), u2 = 1 − u1. This
solution is asymptotically stable for very small α. But as α increases the
solution approaches u1 = u2 = 0.5 (as we have argued before). Thus in
Sato-Crutchfield equations a small number of cooperators in a population of
defectors will increase to reach 50% of the population for α not too large, as
shown in Fig. (3). This is not the case for α = 0 where it is known that
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cooperation will eventually tend to zero. This shows the significant change
between Sato-Crutchfield system and the corresponding replicator one.
Applying Sato-Crutchfield equations to the PDL game, one gets
1
u1
du1
dt
= u2(1− u1)− σ(1− u1 − u2)(u1 + u2)− u
2
2
+α
[
u2 ln(
u2
u1
) + u3 ln(
u3
u1
)
]
,
1
u2
du2
dt
= u2(1− u2)− σ(1− u1 − u2)(u1 + u2)− bu1u2
+α
[
u1 ln(
u1
u2
) + u3 ln(
u3
u2
)
]
,
(13)
where u1 is the fraction of cooperators, u2 is the fraction of defectors and
u3 = 1 − u1 − u2 is the fraction of loners. For α = 0, it is direct to see that
u1 = u2 = 0 is a neutral equilibrium for the system (13). For α > 0, all
strategies coexist. Solving the system (13) numerically for α = 0.1, we get
the fixed point (0.266, 0.155, 0.579). This confirms our conclusion that Sato-
Crutchfield equations is an interesting approach to introduce cooperation in
prisoner’s dilemma type games. As α increases, the choice between the three
strategies becomes random with equal probabilities. Therefore u1, u2 and u3
tend to 1/3.
5 Sato-Crutchfield equations for the battle of
the sexes
Recently, the war between the sexes was emphasizes as being important
[9]. The battle of the sexes [10] is an asymmetric game that simulates the
conflict between males and females concerning their respective shares in their
parental investment. The female has two strategies coy or willing (fast) while
the male can be either faithful or philanderer. The male (female) payoff
matrix A(B) is gives as
A =
[
0 −10
−2 0
]
, B =
[
0 5
3 0
]
.
Here we are applying the Sato-Crutchfield formulation to the battle of
the sexes. The Sato-Crutchfield equations for the battle of the sexes are
∂u
∂t
= u(1− u)(−10 + 12v) + α1u(1− u) ln
(
1−u
u
)
,
∂v
∂t
= v(1− v)(5− 8u) + α2v(1− v) ln
(
1−v
v
)
.
(14)
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There is a unique internal homogeneous equilibrium solution E = (5/8, 5/6)
which is stable; but not asymptotically stable. Therefore in the case α1 =
α2 = 0, one gets oscillations. For the case α1 > 0, α2 > 0, we get
Proposition (1): The equilibrium solution of the system (14) is u =
5/8 − (α2/8) ln 5, v = 5/6 + (α1/12) ln(5/3), and it is asymptotically sta-
ble ∀α1 > 0, α2 > 0.
This shows that in this case there is a significant change between Sato-
Crutchfield system and the corresponding replicator one.
6 Conclusions
Although the Sato-Crutchfield formulation does not affect the ESS for a
game, there is a significant change between Sato-Crutchfield formulation and
the other formulations of games. Sato-Crutchfield formulation is correspond-
ing to losing memory. In some limit, choosing a strategy becomes purely
random independent on the previous experiences, initial conditions, and the
rules of the game itself. This behavior is observed in all the studied systems.
Sato-Crutchfield formulation can be considered as a theoretical explanation
for some aspects in game theory, like the existence of cooperation in a pop-
ulation of defectors.
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Figure 1: For Sato and Crutchfield equations, the densities u1, u2 are plotted
versus α. Both u1 and u2 go to 0.5 for large α. At this point agents chose
their strategies randomly.
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Figure 2: In the Sato-Crutchfield formulation for the hawk-dove game, the
density of hawks u1 is plotted versus α. At α = 0, u1 = 1/4 in agreement
with its ordinary value. As α increases, u1 increases rapidly and become
close to 0.5.
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Figure 3: Using the Sato-Crutchfield equations for the prisoner’s dilemma
game, a small number of cooperators in a population of defectors will increase
to reach 50% of the population as α increases.
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